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INTRODUCTION 
William E. Gladstone was the rising star of the Liberal Party 
between 1859 and 1874. His domestic and foreign policy played a 
role in the two most important developments of this period in British 
History: the surge of liberalism and the loss of British influence 
in European affairs. Because he was the leading British statesman 
of the period, Gladstone's statesmanship is widely blamed by 
contemporaries and historians for Britain's decline in European 
affairs at the time of otto von Bismarck's ascendancy. This study 
seeks to answer the question of whether Gladstone's statesmanship is 
to blame for Great Britain's dramatic slip in European influence. 
The prevailing view is that Gladstone's statesmanship in 
this period failed to contend with the shrewd Realpolitik of 
Bismarck. As a result, critics of Gladstone contend, Britain fell 
from the leading role to secondary status in European diplomatic 
circles in less than ten years. Historians like Paul Kennedy and 
Raymond sontag condemn Gladstone's statesmanship, while others, 
such as Paul Knaplund and H.C.G. Matthew, applaud Gladstone's 
pursuit of morality in his policy, but see his statesmanship as 
second-rate. Similarly, contemporaries like Bismarck and Napoleon 
III had little respect for Gladstone's diplomacy. While each of 
these interpretations raises valid points, none takes into account 
the crucial interplay of foreign and domestic events that limited 
the options available for British diplomacy to respond to the 
challenges of a new Bismarckian order in Europe. 
This study considers the tumultous political environment 
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facing Gladstone both at home and abroad as an accelerator of 
British isolation from European affairs. The interpretation that 
follows demonstrates the critical interplay between internal and 
external affairs by targetting two factors that hamstrung Gladstone's 
statesmanship between 1859 and 1874. First, Gladstone inherited 
a bankrupt and impotent foreign policy from Lord Palmerston's last 
five years at the helm. By 1864, the new Bismarckian order had been 
established and British isolation had been ensured. Secondly, the 
rise of liberalism in Britain preoccupied Gladstone's policy 
throughout the period, with most of his time and energy spent 
uniting the Liberal Party with his legislative agenda. Indeed, 
the constraints on her policy were so great that it would not be 
an overstatement to say that Britain would have found herself just 
as isolated by 1874 even if Bismarck and Gladstone had exchanged 
positions and Britain found herself under the guiding hands of the 
Iron Chancellor. The rise of liberalism in Britain and the limited 
options of British diplomacy painted Gladstone's statesmanship into 
a corner. 
In what follows, the constraints on British policy that led 
to Britain's retreat into diplomatic isolation will be discussed 
so that Gladstone's statesmanship can be evaluated. In this pursuit, 
The Gladstone Diaries, edited in this period by H.C.G. Matthew, 
several articles written by Gladstone, and Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates, were invaluable tools for understanding the motivations, 
inner thoughts, and preoccupations of the leader of the Liberal Party. 
These primary sources allowed a glimpse at Gladstone's sophisticated 
measuring of the national pulse on domestic and external issues, 
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which enabled him to adjust his policy to political exigencies for 
the benefit of the Liberal Party and his country. Gladstone's 
tailoring of his policy to the prevailing winds of his nation is a 
useful index of the rise of liberalism in Britain in this period. 
Because the unity of the British Liberal Party is central to 
understanding the presence of internal and external constraints 
on Gladstone's statesmanship, two approaches to the rise of 
liberalism were used in this study. First, Gladstone's legislative 
agenda and ideology will be analyzed to demonstrate the degree of 
interplay between events in foreign and domestic policy. The 
impact of such events as the Italian Question, the American civil 
War, the Reform Bill of 1867, and the Irish legislation on Gladstone's 
political outlook and the state of the liberal coalition will be 
measured by considering the opinions of contemporaries and historians, 
and election and by-election data. 
Secondly, the three distinct stages of development for 
Gladstone and the Liberal Party are reflected by the division of 
this study into three phases. Phase I, 1859 to 1865, represents 
Gladstone's apprenticeship as a statesman, as Gladstone tackled the 
challenges of pluralism and unified the Liberal Party through his 
financial policy, while British diplomacy was made impotent by the 
presence of the new Bismarckian order in Europe after the Schleswig-
Holstein Crisis in 1864. In Phase II, 1865 to 1868, Gladstone 
emerged as the leading British statesman and the leader of the 
Liberal Party through his Reform Bill victory in 1867. Phase III, 
1869 to 1874, was the test of Gladstonian Liberalism. As Prime 
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Minister, Gladstone's legislative agenda led to the fall of his 
first Ministry, while his foreign policy was successful despite 
the limited options available to British diplomacy. It will be 
shown that, by 1874, despite Gladstone's effective leadership, the 
domestic challenges of the rise of liberalism and the development 
of the Bismarckian order in Europe combined to leave Britain 
diplomatically isolated. 
The legacy of Gladstone's statesmanship between 1859 and 
1874 has been misunderstood by most observers. Faced with 
unprecedented challenges from all sides and at each turn, 
Gladstone fostered the acceptance of the liberal state in 
Britain and lost little ground in the European political arena. 
In so doing, Gladstone cleared the obstacles posed by the complex 
interaction of domestic and foreign challenges and left his mark 
on British History by obtaining a leading role for morality and 
justice in British politics. 
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PHASE I: 1859 to 1865 
The British Liberal Party in Phase I of this study was under 
the guidance of Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, but its rise was 
due primarily to the financial wizardry of Gladstone as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. Events at home and abroad combined to leave 
Britain diplomatically isolated by Palmerston's death in 1865. A 
Britain with more diplomatic options and unchallenged by the rise 
of pluralism might have posed a worthy opponent to otto von Bismarck 
in European politics, but, with a fragmented majority party and 
isolated by the new Bismarckian order, her statesmen lacked the 
maneuverability to reverse her decline in Europe. 
In Phase I, Gladstone's second term as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, he rose to national prominence and served his apprenticeship 
as a statesman. In this period, he was preoccupied by financial 
questions and domestic events and rarely strayed from the positions 
taken by Palmerston and Russell on foreign affairs. His interventions 
were on disagreements of degree rather than of substance. still 
maturing as a statesman, he gained public acclaim for his considerable 
talents in finance. His successes in the financial realm unified 
the Liberal Party as a leading radical, Richard Cobden, notes: 
"I consider that you alone have kept the party together so long 
by your great budgets. 1I1 Gladstone's skills in finance assured 
his acceptance into the party leadership. 
Gladstone's was an eclectic political philosophy, with a 
pragmatic instinct for the "ripeness" of an issue or policy in 
harmony with his distinct ethical code of public service. His 
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approach refused to compromise his high principles in the political 
arena. Gladstone's energy as a public servant was unbounded and 
study of his diaries attests to his ascetic pursuit of the national 
interest and his uncanny sense of political timing. His evolution 
from Tory "Boy Wonder" to progressive national leader reflects his 
sensitivity to the prevailing mood of his country.2 In Phase I, 
Gladstone poured his personal and political resources into solving 
the complex financial problems of the day so that he could unify 
the Liberal Party. 
While there was certainly no love lost between Palmerston 
and Gladstone over the course of policy, both were capable of 
setting aside their mutual disaffection and tolerating the other 
in their professional interaction. 3 Each respected the 
political skills, will, and intellect of the other and their 
differences lay not over objectives of policy, but over principles. 
Palmerston was concerned only with maintaining and increasing 
British influence in Europe and his Ministry's influence at home. 
The pagan "enfant terrible" could neither adapt himself, nor explain 
himself, to the pious chancellor. 4 Their antagonism was most 
divisive over the the defense estimates. While Palmers ton sought 
huge increases in British fortifications to counter the French 
buildup across the Channel, Gladstone sought to limit defense 
spending. Gladstone's skills in finance, and the widespread 
popularity such ability entailed, bridged the gulf between their 
diverging ideologies. 
The battles between British statesmen in Phase I stemmed from 
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conflicting approaches to foreign policy. The foreign policies of 
Lord Russell, Lord Palmerston and Gladstone reflect the ideology 
and respective constituencies of each within the Liberal Party. As 
Foreign Secretary, Russell voiced his diplomatic principles: 5 
.... the Powers of Europe, if they wish to maintain that 
peace, must respect each other's rights, must respect 
each other's limits, and, above all, restore and not 
disturb that commercial confidence which is the result 
of peace, which tends to peace, and which ultimately 
forms the happiness of nations. 
Russell's foreign policy was that of a mainstream whig, prudently 
seeking to assert British influence while avoiding risky ventures. 6 
To Palmerston, maximizing British interests was the sole 
guideline of foreign policy. with a role in British diplomacy 
since 1829, his policies had propelled Britain to a leading role 
in Europe. During the Italian Question in 1860, Palmerston expressed 
his foreign policy doctrine: 7 
England is one of the greatest powers of the world ... 
and her right to have and express opinions on 
matters ... bearing on her interests is unquestionable; 
and she is equally entitled to give upon such matters 
any advice which she might think useful, or to suggest 
any arrangements which she may deem conducive to the 
general good. 
His bluffs and bullying brought the ire of many in his Cabinet, 
the Court, and within parliament, but Palmerston had asserted 
British influence whenever possible, regardless of the risks 
involved. 
Gladstone took a more internationalist stance and held up his 
policy to a moral litmus test. Indeed, one can trace the origins 
of the League of Nations in Paul Knaplund's interpretation of the 
Gladstone Doctrine of foreign policy:8 
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He advocated applying the principles of the Sermon on 
the Mount in dealing with foreign nations -- law, 
justice, and the equal rights of all nations should 
prevail and be recognized; British statesmen should 
strive to promote peace, should further the cause of 
nationality and political liberty, should seek to 
maintain the concert of Europe; they must avoid land-
grabbing and beware of the delusion that peace is 
promoted by large armaments. 
The concept of morality in foreign relations fits into Gladstone's 
ideology. Despite his insulation from the Foreign Office, Gladstone 
reserved the right to comment on moral questions in European affairs. 
During Phase I he voiced his views on the Italian Question, the Papal 
States, the American Civil War, the Cobden Treaty, and the treatment 
of Denmark in the Schleswig-Holstein Affair. 
Domestically, the British Liberal Party in 1859 was incohesive. 
Nominally, it included a part of every class of British society 
under the patronage of Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone. In real 
terms, the party had yet to evolve from a mere parliamentary entity 
to a national party. It remained a precarious coalition of whigs, 
liberal businessmen, and radical nonconformists. Five factors 
stemming from the party's fragmented nature accelerated its rise 
to national prominence These factors include the loose leadership 
of the official party, the growth of the provincial press, the 
agitation of the working class and nonconformists, and the loyalty 
of the whigs to the Liberal Party even after the death of Lord 
Palmerston. Because of these factors, the party was well poised for 
battle with the Tories by 1865. 
First, the loose leadership of the party allowed Gladstone 
the flexibility in his financial policy to gain untapped power 
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brokers. His budgets were as calculating politically as they were 
brilliant fiscally and they helped to unify the Liberal Party. 
Through targetted concessions in the budget, including tax breaks 
and the removal of tariffs, Gladstone improved the livelihoods of 
groups he coveted. Each segment of the budget could be acclaimed 
by a class of British society and Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 
in turn, gained their allegiance. 
Secondly, Gladstone founded the penny press by repealing the 
Paper Duties in 1861. The new penny press diffused ideas and 
propaganda to the poorer classes and across the countryside through 
a growing network of provincial newspapers. The press adopted the 
responsibility of enlightening, civilizing, and morally transforming 
the world;9 and great orators, like Gladstone and John Bright, 
gained national followings. As a result, Gladstone became identified 
with the novelty of this new movement and reaped the benefits of 
strong relationships with many influential members of the press, 
including Thornton Leigh Hunt of the Daily Telegraph. 10 
Through his use of press releases, leaks to the press, and by 
publishing his speeches, Gladstone established the Liberal Party 
as a national entity. 
Thirdly, he turned to the growing working class movement. 
The working classes provided a national base of support and a pre-
existing network of union organization in many industries. Gladstone 
had no reverence for working class society, but was pleased to 
make the Liberal Party the only option for its electors, thereby 
undergirding his national support. By repealing the Paper Duties 
9 
and removing tariffs on such working class food staples as beer, 
tea, coffee, and sugar in his budgets, Gladstone captured the 
working class for his party. But, he was hardly ecstatic about 
including the working class in his coalition: "God knows I have 
not courted them, I hope I do not rely on them." 11 
Fourthly, Gladstone gained the support of nonconformists within 
the Commons and in British boroughs. These men were committed to 
Gladstone's agenda of social welfare and could command tremendous 
resources because of their abundance of time, energy, popular 
connections and money. They pursued a better society with the same 
motivation that brought them their fortunes and political influence. 
To gain their support, Gladstone turned to his 1860 Budget by 
granting tax exemptions for life-insurance policies and deferred 
annuities. Thus, he could shield the non-landed from the burden 
of an increase in income tax while at the same time stimulating 
the economy_ 
Finally, Gladstone's concessions to the landed whigs ensured 
the emergence of the Liberal Party. The whigs were a conservative 
force within the liberal coalition and sought to maintain their 
privileged social and economic position. His refusal to attach 
himself too closely to the radicals in his policy initiatives by 
ste~ring clear of reform, abolition of the Church Rates, and 
financial attacks on the whig lifestyle assured their support. 
Also, his piecemeal liberalism was attractive to the whigs because 
of their disrespect for Disraeli and their identification with 
Palmerston and Russell. 
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Gladstone's tailoring of financial policy to the unlikely 
coalition of whigs, liberals, radicals, nonconformists, and the 
working class in Phase I made him the leader of the Liberal Party. 
His financial policy combined his ethical code of politics, including 
free trade, social welfare and retrenchment, with a pragmatic 
adjustment to a changing British political landscape. Meanwhile, 
the challenges to British foreign policy in these years also 
contributed to the growth of pluralism in British politics. Both 
the Italian Question and the American Civil War turned into domestic 
issues that strengthened the liberal coalition. 
Three new developments imposed constraints on British foreign 
policy. First, the rise of newspapers such as the Times, the 
Daily Telegraph, the Bee Hive, and the provincial press 
meant that statesmen had to devote more time and energy to relations 
with the press. Secondly, Queen Victoria's demands for an increased 
role in foreign affairs, especially after the death of Prince Albert 
in 1861, slowed the response of British diplomacy. Finally, special 
interests used the press and the absence of party stability as an 
opportunity to assert their role in foreign policy. For example, 
unions and business groups were active on the American Civil War, 
while radical and agriculture lobbies were active on the Cobden 
Treaty. 
Gladstone stepped into the foreign policy arena when questions 
of morality arose. His interventions took the form of public speeches, 
articles, and Cabinet memoranda. The infrequency of his comments 
on foreign policy is due to his preoccupation with the time-consuming 
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duties of his office. But, his sense of national interest would 
not allow him silence during these years of decreasing British 
influence. Each crisis in international affairs in Phase I 
influenced Britain both domestically and in her position among the 
other powers of Europe. The impact of each event on the unity of 
the Liberal Party, the new Bismarckian order, fundamental British 
interests, and Gladstone's ideology will be discussed. Because 
they had the greatest impact domestically in Britain, the Italian 
Question and the American civil War will be considered first. 
The Italian Question erupted in early 1858 and remained a 
leading issue in European affairs for the next three years. Cavour's 
brilliant manipulation of Napoleon III's territorial aspirations 
combined with the failure of Austrian and Russian diplomacy to 
allow Italian unification in 1861. Italian statesmen understood 
that Italy could be unified only by exploiting the differences 
between the Great powers.12 Cavour embarked on his path with 
the benefit of Napoleon's sponsorship, assured by the Franco-Sardinian 
Treaty of January 2, 1859, Austrian isolation, assured by the Franco-
Russian Treaty of March 3, 1859, and Britain's tacit compliance. 
His diplomatic skill transformed a war that lacked justification on 
any basis of international law into one that has been unanimously 
approved by posterity.13 
In Britain, Cavour's Italy was applauded for confronting 
the decaying forces of reaction and conservatism in Austria. The 
cause of Italian unification became a rallying point for the 
blossoming liberal coalition. The consensus in Britain was for 
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neutrality with an assurance that Napoleon would make no "territorial 
demands and Austria would lose little of its influence in Europe, 
especially in the Near East. Britain's support for the Sardinian 
cause made Palmers ton assert that Austria could appeal to the 
judgement but not the sympathies of Europe. 14 Academics who 
embraced Italian nationalism and praised Cavour as a prudent liberal 
formed an unlikely coalition with the working class over the Italian 
Question because of shared enthusiasm for Italian liberalism and 
shared enmity for Austrian conservatism. 15 Identification with 
the Italian movement transcended parochial class distinctions, 
allowing radicals and whigs alike to support Cavour and his attractive 
nationalism. 
The unification of Italy was the first hint of a new Bismarckian 
European order that would overthrow the system established at Vienna 
in 1815. Three factors brought on the upheaval. First, the Italian 
uprising upset the balance of power in Europe by diminishing Austrian 
influence. The Franco-Russian Entente and Bismarck's competition 
within Germany combined to destroy Austrian hopes for a Holy Alliance 
and left Austria diplomatically isolated during the critical battles 
of the days ahead. Secondly, French adventurism increased British 
distrust of Napoleon. The British viewed him as expansionist and 
saw no reason to bridge the gap between their policies which would 
hamper the future responses of both to the challenges of the new 
Bismarckian order. Finally, the Czar had asserted his unwillingness 
to playa role in western Europe. He would only pledge his assistance 
to Napoleon in return for the promise of future gains in the Near 
East. 
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At the outset of the Italian conflict, Gladstone was preoccupied 
with domestic problems and seemed indifferent. In his diary he shows 
his removal from the question: "War is begun. May God direct it." l6 
But, he soon stated his views on the conflict in an article in the 
Quarterly Review and in a memorandum on the Papal states. Both 
show exceptionally well-informed opinions on a foreign policy question 
for a Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
In the article, Gladstone spells out his argument for Britain 
to tread lightly in Italy. First, he condemns the policies of both 
the French and Austrians. He attacked the Austrian treatment of the 
Italians, and he saw the infamous Buol Dispatch of February 25, 1859, 
to illustrate that, "a blind Conservatism may come to be the most 
dangerous Radicalism, and that the closets and cabinets of despotic 
sovereigns are too often the main factories of Revolution. 1117 
He saw Austrian policy necessitating that, "in no other way than by 
the sword shall any Italian be free." 18 His respect for 
international law and morality in foreign policy made him appeal to 
the Austrians to rule within the limits of legal rights. But, 
Gladstone could use nothing more than words, for he maintained that 
an Austrian military presence was vital to the European balance of 
power. Gladstone was fearful of the territorial designs of Napoleon, 
but understood his position: "she is strong enough to paralyse that 
commanding union of force and authority, by which alone, placed on 
the side of right, the Italian question can be peacefully adjusted.,,19 
Gladstone's policy was for support of Cavour through neutrality. 
Gladstone was hopeful for Sardinian liberalism. He praised 
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Italian unification from within and applauded Cavour for planting 
a tree of liberty that had been watered neither by blood nor tears. 
His view was similar to that of Palmerston and Russell, but it was 
within his own moral framework. He held that the British role in 
the conflict should be to urge the principles of reason and justice 
while standing clear of selfish interest. 20 So long as the 
conflict destroyed little of Austria's power in the Near East and 
did not spur the adventurism of Napoleon, Gladstone supported the 
Italian cause. 
Gladstone then discussed the Papal states. With a mixture of 
sympathy for the national self-determination of the Papal subjects 
and long-standing anti-Papism, he condemned the Papacy as the worst 
and most ridiculous of European governments. He maintained that 
the only remedy for the existing evils was the permanent separation 
of the temporal from the spiritual power. The stagnation, imbecility, 
and anarchy of Papal rule confronted Gladstone's notion of religious 
self-determination, which held that the state should be detached from 
the church. 21 His attack on the temporal power of the Papacy 
appealed to the progressive sector of the Liberal party.22 
Just as in the Italian Question, the American civil War 
penetrated British politics at many levels and posed a challenge to 
British statesmen. While the early days of the civil War sharpened 
existing divisions in British society, the Emancipation Proclamation 
of September, 1862, strengthened the liberal coalition. The 
identification of the sectors of the British polity with the Union 
and the Confederacy respectively was a veil for the social and 
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political antagonisms prevailing in Britain and taught Gladstone 
valuable lessons about the interplay of domestic and foreign policy 
in British politics. 23 The Union's victory accelerated the growth 
of liberalism in Britain and challenged the privileges of the landed 
classes. 
The pro-Confederacy sentiment in Britain was a combination 
of businessmen, workers hurt by the Northern blockade and class-
conscious aristocracy. It was a sector concerned primarily with 
social and economic factors. The disaffected workers hit hardest 
by the blockade were spurred by the powerful Bee Hive, while 
the landed feared that a victory by the industrialized North would 
set a dangerous precedent for their lifestyles and businessmen 
feared the costs to British commerce. Additionally, moderates in 
the Liberal Party were uneasy about Lincoln's friendship with British 
Radicals and with John Bright, whose ideals, friends, and works 
were anathema to them. 24 Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone 
were all card-carrying supporters of the confederacy.25 
On the other hand, Unionist sentiment in Britain mirrored the 
liberal coalition itself, lacking only the support of its leading 
statesmen and the whigs. It included the working class, radicals 
and academics, who unlike the pro-Confederacy coalition, did not 
have their livelihoods at stake in the American conflict. They 
were therefore willing to overlook economic considerations for the 
cause of the Union's liberalism. Radicals were strongly pro-Union 
and Bright himself respected the opportunities offered by the North's 
tenet that "every man may hope and does hope to rise to wealth. ,,26 
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Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was a turning point for 
the Liberal Party by delivering the bulk of the working class to 
the Unionist position. 27 Gladstone followed Lincoln's message 
with his own powerful speech at Newcastle on October 8, 1862. His 
oversight of British finance would not allow him to overlook the 
economic costs of the Northern blockade. First, he appealed to 
pocketbooks by outlining the decline of the British economy as a 
result of the Northern blockade. He speculated that the value of 
British trade with the united states had diminished by as much as 
nine and a half million pounds, and the quadrupled price of cotton 
meant that only "one-half of the owners of mills and factories are 
keeping open their works. 1128 
Finally, he expressed his contempt for the Northern government, 
which he felt was growing too fast and had too often threatened 
Canada. 29 On the other hand, Gladstone had nothing but respect 
for the Confederate leaders, perhaps seeing a reflection of the 
British model in their institutions: "There is no doubt that 
Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; 
they are making a navy; and they have made what is more than either 
-- they have made a nation.,,30 A large segment of the whigs 
shared this view and Gladstone could overlook none of the economic 
hardships caused by the Northern blockade, nor could he afford to 
compromise whig opinion. 
Gladstone's brilliance as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
Phase I responded to the rise of pluralism and united the liberal 
coalition. But, on the issue of parliamentary reform, he was more 
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a man of his time. The editor of his diaries, H.C.G. Matthew, 
observes that the curious dislocation of early victorian politics 
meant that "fiscal liberalism had been achieved while political 
liberalism had barely begun. 11 31 It was no accident that 
Gladstone's liberalism failed to spillover into the reform question, 
for he believed that support for reform might be enough to push the 
whigs into the waiting arms of the Tories. 32 Also, his keen 
sense of timing and feel for the "ripeness" of issues, his personal 
reservations about the reform issue, and the opposition of Palmerston, 
the Court, and the Cabinet to reform initiatives made him rely on 
financial questions to popularize his party.33 Thus, he took 
the safest course to form a consensus for his party while keeping 
whig support intact. 
In Gladstone's pursuit of a greater Britain, he combined a 
Burkean, incremental course that would avoid great upheavals in 
policy with a Peelite concern for government thrift. 34 He 
waited for the prevailing temper of the nation to demand change 
and planned his course accordingly. with long range political 
objectives in mind, he would allow economic progress to silence 
cries for parliamentary reform until action was made necessary. 
Indeed, his increase of the income tax in the 1860 Budget was 
particularly sensitive to the social repercussions of the tax. 
Moreover, his bitter clashes with Somerset at the Admiralty and his 
long-time friend Herbert at the War Office show his deep concerns 
about the implications of government spending priorities. 
Gladstone's concept of morality in the practice of politics 
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was the backbone of his ideology and the chief motivator of his 
policy. Even up to 1865 he saw little prospect of peaceful, 
major change in Britain, so he zealously pursued smaller alterations 
like reducing waste and spending. He stated that, "Religion and 
Christian virtue, like the faculty of taste and perception of 
beauty, have their place, ay and that the first place", in the 
conduct of politics. 35 He applied his distinct ethical code to 
his political life like no other British statesman before or since. 
The Cobden Treaty of 1861 was perhaps Gladstone's most active 
involvement in the realm of foreign affairs as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Apart from the leading role free trade played in his 
ideology, he saw economic and diplomatic benefits in the Cobden 
Treaty. After concluding the treaty, he outlined his achievement: 
"Whatever may have been our most sanguine expectations as to the 
operation of that treaty, whether in a social or commercial sense, 
up to this moment, they have been more than fulfilled.,,36 The 
significance of the treaty lies in its impact domestically. It 
allowed the Liberal Party to corner the popular issue of free trade. 
But the treaty failed to defuse growing tensions on both sides 
of the Channel sparked by the French annexation of Nice and Savoy 
in 1860 and the race in armaments. The Anglo-French antagonism 
would plague the conduct of British foreign and domestic policy 
throughout this period. When Napoleon expressed his intention to 
reassert French influence in world affairs, even at the cost of 
friendly relations with the British Government, by augmenting 
French sea power, he touched on raw British nerves. 37 British 
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statesmen disagreed about the readiness of the nation's defenses in 
the face of the French threat and a controversy soon developed with 
Palmerston and the Court taking up the cause of fortification. 
Gladstone, true to his minimalist view of finance, sought to constrain 
defense spending and the Cobden Treaty could alleviate much of 
the Treasury's burden while fitting easily into his objective of 
creating a model of international free trade. 38 
Gladstone hoped to construct a bridge of friendship, supported 
by pillars of economic interdependence between the two nations. 39 
In so doing, he ran into the opposition of Palmerston, who saw 
the treaty as creating a greater need for fortification. 40 The 
latter had the support of both the Cabinet and the Court, while 
Gladstone depended on an alliance of Cobdenite radicals, free trade 
whigs, business interests, and liberal intellectuals. Gladstone 
joined Cobden in negotiations with the French and reached an 
agreement without consulting either Palmerston or the Foreign 
Office. The treaty itself was narrow in its economic scope, but 
rich in its symbolic benefits domestically for the Liberal Party. 
The Italian Question, the American civil War, and the Cobden 
Treaty constituted Gladstone's active participation in foreign 
affairs during Phase I of this study. In each question, domestic 
considerations and Gladstone's personal ideology were the chief 
motivations behind his policy. Although his diaries show some 
additional interest in the course of continental events, he was 
too immersed in domestic affairs to contend with challenges on the 
continent that had little impact on the unity of the Liberal Party. 
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Events had hemmed Britain into a predictable course in its 
foreign policy and Bismarck took full advantage of her inflexibility 
in the Polish Question and the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis. Palmerston's 
diplomatic glory was behind him and his aggressiveness and adventuring 
spirit were gradually deserting him.41 Facing the new and unique 
challenges of the rise of pluralism and with few diplomatic options, 
Britain fell prey to the new Bismarckian order in Europe. Thus, by 
Palmerston's death in October of 1865 Britain stood isolated and 
with a greatly diminished role in Europe. 
The insurrection in Poland on January 24, 1863, further shook 
the European order. A new instability developed in European diplomacy 
which would allow the Iron Chancellor to gain for Prussia the leading 
role in the German Confederation and in European affairs. Bismarck's 
success was due to British diplomatic impotency, the gulf between 
British and French diplomacy, the isolation of Austria, and the Iron 
Chancellor's manipulation of the Czar. After the Polish Question, 
Bismarck's control of European diplomacy was firmly established. 
Popular sentiment in Britain was supportive of the Polish rebels, 
but Palmerston and Russell had no diplomatic options. First, Queen 
Victoria's Prussophile leanings made her veto both unilateral and 
joint intervention in the crisis. In hindsight, the handicaps under 
which the Foreign Office worked makes her view seem reasonable. 42 
Secondly, growing British distrust of Napoleon ruled out cooperation 
at a time when England, coming to grips with Bismarck, needed French 
support as never before. 43 Napoleon risked the Franco-Russian 
Entente by bowing to French public opinion and expressing his support 
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for the insurrection. Finally, Austria, hardly a friend to Britain 
against her brother emperors, could do nothing but follow the Prussian 
lead in Poland because of her precariousness in the German Confederation 
Although there was little chance of a renewal of the Holy Alliance, 
due to competition between Austria and Prussia in Germany and Austria 
and Russia in the Near East, Britain could turn to none of the three 
eastern powers. In European diplomacy, Britain's hands were tied. 
Limited to rhetoric, Palmerston thus turned to sharp and 
persistent protests to st. petersburg. 44 The absence of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer's opinions on the question is perhaps an 
indication of its limited impact on domestic affairs. There is no 
more than casual mention of the affair in his diaries and there is 
little indication that he would have taken a separate course from 
that of Palmerston. Moreover, Gladstone defended the Government's 
policy in the Commons, arguing that Britain should not lose its 
bargaining position on behalf of the Polish people at st. petersburg. 45 
The Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864 confirmed Bismarck's 
diplomatic mastery of Europe and culminated in Britain and Palmerston 
"drinking a cup of humiliation more bitter" than any before. 46 
The Danish defeat on July 20, 1864, left Britain an isolated and 
weary nation. In Schleswig-Holstein, as in the Polish Question, 
events beyond the control of British statesmen limited their possible 
responses to the aggression of Prussia and Austria against Denmark. 
European diplomacy had taken an uncertain turn and the checks on 
aggressive policy were removed: the eastern powers could no longer 
restrain France, France could no longer restrain Russia, and France 
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and Russia could no longer restrain Austria and Prussia. 47 The 
growing British contempt for the fickleness of Napoleon, the 
Francophobe outlook of the Queen, and Austria and Russia's position 
in the Prussian orbit combined to rule out joint action on Denmark's 
behalf. 
With an absence of a domestic consensus and a new European order, 
Britain had no options. Palmerston sought to guarantee Copenhagen, 
but his inability to bring the Cabinet to his view made him balk at 
the guarantee. Because of British inaction, the Danes overestimated 
their support from Britain, and ended any chance of their adopting 
a conciliatory attitude towards the Germans. 48 Queen victoria 
and the Cabinet responded by ruling out British military intervention, 
which not only allowed the annexation of the duchies by the German 
powers, but was also the final demonstration of British isolation 
from the events of the continent. 
Again, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not provide an 
alternative to Palmerston's policy. He outlines his mainstream 
position against British intervention in the crisis in his diary:49 
We don't meddle with the war but think independence of 
D(enmark) a matter of importance to us & all, so we say 
thus far no further -- we will not see Denmark utterly 
crushed. Get engagement from Aust. & Pruss. that wd. 
confine their operations to the continent & adjacent 
islands & not attack Copenhagen. 
Gladstone also adopted a non-interventionist stance in the 
Cabinet on June 25, 1864, by voting against Palmerston and 
Russell on technical language that would ensure the protection of 
Copenhagen. 50 Gladstone showed no overriding concern with the 
Danish Question, merely making a plea against British overcommitment. 
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In his preparation for a leading role in British politics in 
Phase I, Gladstone adjusted his policy to a changing Britain. His 
financial policy assured him a larger role in the cabinet and British 
politics and increased the strength of the Liberal Party. Gladstone's 
rise to influence through his financial policy mirrored the rise of 
the Liberal Party to the forefront of British politics. 51 While 
the Liberal Party was by no means dominant by 1865, it had emerged 
as a national force in British politics. 
Gladstone's interest in foreign policy in Phase I of this 
study was dominated by his political morality and the value of issues 
to the unity of the Liberal Party. His comments and actions on the 
Italian Question, the American Civil War, and the Cobden Treaty 
demonstrated his position as the leading moral conscience in British 
politics. Nonetheless, the lack of British diplomatic options doomed 
the efforts of British statesmen to reverse the loss of Britain's 
influence in the new Bismarckian order. The outcome of Phase I of 
this study reveals a Britain occupying a severely diminished role in 
Europe and Gladstone as the rising star of British politics. 
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PHASE II: 1865 to 1868 
In Phase II of this study, British statesmen faced domestic 
turmoil in the form of party strife and the development of such 
controversial issues as parliamentary reform and Irish Church 
disestablishment. These issues combined with new diplomatic 
challenges to continue the retreat of British foreign policy into 
isolation from continental affairs. It will be argued below that 
Gladstone and other British leaders in this period faced domestic 
upheaval and had few diplomatic options in responding to events on 
the continent. With Britain in isolation an obstacle was removed 
for otto von Bismarck to consolidate his hold on Europe. 
This political turmoil provided Gladstone with perhaps his 
greatest tests as a statesman. He used his parliamentary skill, 
moral integrity and political resiliency to adjust to a volatile 
electorate and an increasingly unpredictable House of Commons. 
In Phase II he emerged as the leader of the Liberal Party by 
withstanding a major embarrassment in the Reform Bill debacle of 
1866, and uniting his party by reshaping the 1867 Reform Bill; by 
introducing legislation to disestablish the Irish Church in 1868; 
and by gaining a commanding majority in the 1868 elections. 
Although few statesmen have dealt more successfully with subjects 
of such difficulty, Gladstone maintained his principles and made 
the transition from efficient administrator to national political 
leader. 1 
Domestically, Gladstone's ethical code provided him a 
framework for adjusting his ideology to the challenges of pluralism. 
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His ideology combined a sophisticated measure of public opinion 
with his high principles and religious fervor. To Gladstone, Britain 
was a moral society distinct from religion, but destined to combine 
and coalesce with it, so that she could become the liberal example 
for the world. 2 
By 1865 the Bismarckian order had been firmly established in 
Europe. European affairs became a more complex game of diplomacy 
where national interest alone was paramount. 3 This new order 
dealt Britain a hand that greatly increased her diplomatic isolation. 
The uncertainty in the European political arena limited Britain's 
options so that she could regain little of her previous influence 
in European affairs. 
Any study of the Liberal Party in this period should consider 
the question of Gladstone's opportunism. His political skills and 
instinct for the "ripeness" of issues led many observers to contend 
that his approach to politics smelled of opportunism. Some argue 
that Gladstone's religious convictions were merely a cover for his 
political ambition, and that his moral righteousness blinded him to 
the fact that his original motivation was usually political. 4 
Others doubt that Gladstone's political career had been sustained 
by anything more than personal ambition. 5 Additionally, one 
could argue that Gladstone played a leading role in "ripening" 
issues like parliamentary reform and the Irish Question merely for 
his own and his party's political benefit. 
Gladstone's principles and objectives and the political 
environment in Britain in this period reveal two flaws in the theory. 
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First, Gladstone's diaries show the painstaking decision-making 
process he underwent to arrive at his positions on issues like 
Ireland and parliamentary reform. For example, Gladstone saw his 
early support for disestablishment of the Irish Church as an 
"embryo opinion in my mind as there was no cause to precipitate it 
into life, and (I) waited to fortify or alter or invalidate it by 
the teachings of experience. 1I6 He went to similar lengths to 
adopt a position of support for parliamentary reform, condemning 
those who thought that it was a "subject to be played with or traded 
on.,,7 In both instances, Gladstone had taken years to develop 
his positions. Secondly, the political climate in Victorian Britain 
was far too complex for a statesman of even Gladstone's stature to 
steer events to his own political end. Such an interpretation places 
too great an emphasis on the role of the individual in modern society. 
Gladstone's skill in adjusting his outlook to political 
exigencies cannot alone mark him an opportunist. His biographer, 
John Morley, disagrees with attempts to label Gladstone as such, 
adding that, "if an opportunist be defined as a statesman who 
declines to attempt to do a thing until he believes that it can 
really be done, what is this but to call him a man of common 
sense?"S Gladstone never compromised his principles, he merely 
made adjustments in the timing, accent, and method of achieving 
his political objectives. It was Disraeli, his opponent on the 
Conservative front bench, who is more deserving of the opportunist 
label. 
The death of Lord Palmers ton left the Liberal Party a precarious 
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coalition of liberals, radicals, whigs and nonconformists both within 
and outside the House of Commons. By 1868, Gladstone had used two 
issues -- restructuring the 1866 Reform Bill and initiating Irish 
Church disestablishment to unify the coalition. He created the 
whig-working class entente to act as a double weapon for the Liberal 
Party on the reform question. On one hand, addressing the reform 
question would yield the balance of the British working class and 
radicals for the Liberal Party, while, on the other, the whig sector 
would guard against frivolous legislation that might lead to domestic 
upheaval. 
By maintaining his link to Palmerston and Russell's moderate 
and non-revolutionary liberalism, Gladstone enjoyed the support of 
the whigs. Although his vague agenda made a certain degree of 
disunity unavoidable, it also enabled the party to include a variety 
of opinions which acted at the same time as a powerful influence 
against disintegration. 9 Indeed, the absence of party dogma 
and the lack of a clearcut leadership hierarchy, as under Lord 
Palmerston, combined with continued widespread dislike of Disraeli 
to provide Gladstone with a strong majority in the Commons. Gladstone 
further improved his popularity by extra-parliamentary addresses and 
by maintaining a strong relationship with the press. 
Gladstone's whig-working class entente shows his sophisticated 
tailoring of the Liberal Party's message. He could embody the whig 
social ideal by keeping radical pressures and extra-parliamentary 
agitation in check and guiding those energies into constructive, 
but safe channels,10 while attending to working class hopes 
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of social mobility. Gladstone's remarks on May 11, 1864, often 
referred to as his "Pale of the Constitution" Speech, show his 
willingness to make only limited adjustments to the franchise. In 
the speech, he qualified his famous appeal to bring more electors 
under the pale of the constitution by vowing not to, "recede from 
the protest I have previously made against sudden, or violent, or 
excessive, or intoxicating change."ll Gladstone could thereby 
merge progressive appeals on behalf of the working class with the 
moderation of the whigs. 
The death of Lord Palmerston and the declining influence of 
Lord Russell were the first openings for Gladstone's emergence as 
leader of the Liberal Party. While the entire nation grieved the 
loss of a statesman whose, "heart always beat for the honour of 
England,,,12 Palmerston's death marked the end of a clearcut 
course in domestic and foreign policy. The direction of Britain's 
foreign policy was unclear, but her diminished role and lack of 
allies in European affairs were evident, with Russia hostile, 
Prussia unfriendly, France estranged, and the united states angry.13 
The passiveness and inactivity of British foreign policy since the 
Crimean War and specifically in the wake of the Schleswig-Holstein 
Crisis had left Britain only a secondary player with few options in 
the new Bismarckian order. 
The diplomatic baton was passed to Gladstone and Disraeli, two 
leaders with uncertain capacity in the nuances of foreign pOlicy. 
Each had his own distinct approach to foreign policy, but neither 
could reverse the loss in terms of British influence. Gladstone 
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viewed politics as the arena in which to discover God's intentions 
for the world, and foreign policy was the means of spreading God's 
intentions throughout Europe and the globe. 14 His foreign policy 
stressed the principle of collective, peaceful intervention, by way 
of advice and recommendation. 15 But such intervention had to be 
in accordance with the opinions of a nation's inhabitants. 16 
Unfortunately, Gladstone's utterances were inapplicable to the new 
rules governing diplomacy in Europe and Bismarck was convinced 
that so long as the liberalism of 'Professor' Gladstone was dominant, 
England's army would be weak and her diplomacy impotent. 17 
On the other hand, Benjamin Disraeli's foreign policy commanded 
respect from Bismarck. In tune with the pursuit of national interest, 
Disraeli saw a dynamic foreign policy as a means to personal power 
and national glory. Because they mirrored his own approach, 
Bismarck respected Disraeli's opportunism and his conservative strain. 
Disraeli offered Britain a choice between "a comfortable England .... 
meeting in due course an inevitable fate and a great country -- an 
Imperial country .•.• a land of liberty, of prosperity, of power, and 
of glory. illS Again, however, domestic turmoil and limited 
diplomatic options blunted the effect of Disraeli's eloquence. 
That Gladstone and the statesmen of Britain failed to adjust 
their foreign policy to an altered Europe indicates the degree of 
Britain's isolation, their preoccupation with domestic events and 
their miscalculation of the motives and capacity of Bismarck. The 
Liberal Party became the domain of reform, free trade, and limited 
defense spending, but lost its claim to the foreign policy expertise 
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it had had in Palmerston's years of glory. The Prussian victory 
over Austria in June of 1866 strengthened the foundations of the 
Bismarckian order and further isolated Britain. 
Gladstone's leadership of the Liberal Party was strengthened 
by his numerous extra-parliamentary speeches, and his memorable 
exchanges with Disraeli in the House of Commons. Gladstone carried 
the mantle of liberalism into the charged debates against the 
conservative leader and the battles brought out the best in his 
oratory and debating skills. There is also little doubt that facing 
his brilliant conservative opponent accelerated his evolution to 
support for parliamentary reform and Irish Church disestablishment. 
Gladstonian ideology had embraced reform since the late 1850s, 
but only to the point of compromise. He sponsored the limited 
Russell Reform Bill of 1866, which sought only to delay a problem 
that was ripe for social agitation. Gladstone explained that he 
supported reform because, "in freedom, in the free discharge of 
political duties, there is an immense power both of discipline 
and of education for the people.,,19 But the 1866 bill was 
conservative in nature. First, only limited suffrage extension 
was granted so as not to undermine the mid-century order of state, 
Party, and politics. 20 Secondly, Gladstone explained that 
the measure was adopted because it left the working class in a 
marked minority.21 Unfortunately, Russell and Gladstone had 
miscalculated and the half-hearted bill garnered support from 
neither side of the house. Thirdly, because it would be opposed 
by those M.P.'s who would be dropped from the Commons if it included 
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provisions for redistribution, the bill included only provisions 
for franchise reform. Gladstone explained that redistribution 
would be addressed later, but was "a matter of only secondary 
importance. 1122 Because of their aversion to redistribution, 
this was music to the whig ears. Ironically, it was the conservatives, 
not the liberals, who would soon reopen the redistribution issue. 
Gladstone had miscalculated. General Grosvenor's amendment 
on April 19 called for full disclosure of the Ministry's intentions 
for the bill. He charged that the Government had introduced the 
bill, "like a thief in the night; it was masked; half its features 
were disguised, and yet they were surprised that the House did not 
fall in love with the object.,,23 Robert Lowe, who later served 
in Gladstone's first Ministry, added that, "history may tell of 
other acts as signally disastrous, but none more wanton, none more 
disgraceful. ,,24 Even one of Gladstone's greatest speeches 
reduced little of the opposition in the Commons. He outlined the 
Government's commitment to parliamentary reform: 25 
You cannot fight against the future. Time is on our 
side. The great social forces which move onwards in 
their might and majesty, and which the tumult of our 
debates does not for a moment impede or disturb 
those great social forces are against you; they are 
marshalled on our side. 
The Ministry could defeat the amendment by only five votes, an 
obvious defeat, and the Russell Government resigned on June 19. 
Its successor, the Derby Ministry, was immediately met by 
two extra-parliamentary factors that combined to ripen the issue 
of reform: the financial crisis and the Reform League's Hyde Park 
agitation in the summer of 1867. 26 Gladstone feared that the 
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strife might worsen by involving forces that had not yet been 
drawn into the heat of political controversy. The minority status 
of the Conservative Party combined with the prospect of working class 
agitation to convince Disraeli that his party would benefit from a 
major reform initiative. He merely joined members on both sides of 
the house who viewed it safe to concede working class enfranchisement 
and dangerous to withhold it. 27 still, steadfast conservatives 
were fearful and Lord Derby observed that, "we are making a great 
experiment, and taking a leap in the dark. ,,28 By initiating· 
the 1867 Reform Bill, Disraeli sacrificed his pledges to place and 
his principles to power. 29 
Gladstone stepped in to restructure the bill. It was apparent 
to him that Disraeli had intended to extend the franchise by one 
part of his plan, while neutralizing its extension by the other. 3D 
Disraeli's accent was on "fancy franchises", rating, dual votes, 
and compound householders, all of which would only widen the 
privileges of the upper classes. 31 Newfound pro-reform sentiment 
arose from the "Tea Room Revolt" of April 5, 1867,32 giving 
Gladstone more support to "make a good bill out of a bad bill.,,33 
He condemned Disraeli's intentions by stirring up the Commons and the 
press with his progressive appeals and he forced Disraeli to admit 
that, "the government will never introduce household suffrage pure 
and simple. 1I34 The summer's social strife had brought Gladstone 
around to the view that if reform should come, it should be broad 
and bold. 35 He had learned from his failure of 1866. 
Gladstone succeeded in restructuring the Derby Ministry's 
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major legislative initiative from the opposition front bench. 
With the aid of the Hodgkinson Amendment on May 17 he forced 
Disraeli to incorporate his eight progressive improvements into 
the bill. 36 The bill's passage on July 15 strengthened the 
whig-working class entente. The whigs were loyal to Gladstone's 
calculated success and continued to be leery of Disraeli, while 
the working class owed its right to vote, its daily newspapers, 
and the low prices of its daily food staples to the leader of the 
Liberal Party. Gladstone had brought both groups into his party. 
Meanwhile, during the heat of the reform crisis in 1866, 
tensions in Europe were growing. Britain's miscalculation of 
the Iron Chancellor further limited her foreign policy options 
and doomed her to isolation. Because his motives were seen as 
inconsistent and unorthodox, Bismarck posed an enigmatic figure. 
But British statesmen were not alone in failing to understand 
"whether Herr von Bismarck thought more than he said, or said 
more than he thought.,,37 Because he alone understood the new 
European order, the Iron Chancellor was the only statesman in 
Europe who could play the new game of diplomacy. 
Austrian diplomacy was perhaps the easiest prey for 
Bismarckian policy in Phase II, and the Iron Chancellor needed 
none of the sophisticated tools for the Austrians which he required 
against the French. Bismarck first painted Austria into a diplomatic 
corner through bluffs and then swiftly capitalized on her weakness 
through force. His diplomacy led to the victory over Austria which 
demonstrated the capacity of Prussia's Minister, the strength of 
38 
her army, and the worth of her armaments to an astonished continent. 38 
Two events eased Bismarck's task. First, he tested the 
European powers at Gastein in August of 1865, by dictating one-sided 
terms for the division of Schleswig and Holstein. The relative 
silence of European diplomacy to the terms fortified Prussian demands 
and proved to Bismarck that "the statesman who fears has no chance 
against the statesman who dares.,,39 Secondly, the Iron Chancellor 
feigned acceptance of Napoleon's call for a conference on the German 
Question in May of 1865, knowing that Austrian pride would reject 
the offer and lead directly to conflict. Again, Bismarck understood 
that Austria's overconfidence would make her reject the opening 
which might have saved her from disaster. 40 Because of her 
isolation, Britain could only watch. The Austrian rejection of the 
conference removed the only diplomatic obstacle for Prussia, and 
Bismarck sought only a cause for war. 
To obtain just provocation, the Iron Chancellor relied on 
his familiar combination of bluff and intimidation. First, he 
argued that Austria, who had already mobilized and suspended her 
diplomatic ties to Prussia, was the aggressor by summoning the 
Estates of Holstein without Prussian consent. Sparked by Bismarck's 
condemnation over the technicality, Austria declared war on June 18. 
within weeks, the victory at Sadowa demonstrated the prominence of 
Prussian iron, and Europe had seen no more crushing victory since 
Waterloo. 41 Bismarck's defeat of Austria made Prussian hegemony 
in Germany a virtual fait accompli by June of 1866. 
The resounding force of the Pruss ian victory clouds both 
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Bismarck's diplomatic achievements and the failure of European 
diplomacy. The vacuum in European politics had allowed Bismarck 
to threaten the status quo with provocative statements: 42 
The great questions of the day will not be decided by 
speeches and majority votes -- that was the great 
mistake of 1848 and 1849 -- but through blood and iron. 
He further boasted that Europe would soon have reason to know 
"how superior our guns are to the Austrian artillery.,,43 By 
combining duplicity with force, Bismarck secured his dominance of 
Europe. 
In Bismarck's scheme, France had to be isolated next to remove 
the only remaining obstacle to Prussian policy. Three factors left 
France without an ally: the Polish Question led to the collapse of 
the Franco-Russian Entente, animosity continued in Anglo-French 
relations, and Franco-Austrian tension grew over Italy. Of these 
factors, the key was the Anglo-French antagonism, which had developed 
steadily since the French annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1859. 
The enmity was expressed in the arms race44 and in British 
fears of Napoleon's expansionism, and led to a failure of their 
foreign policies to cooperate even when objectives overlapped, as 
in the Polish Question and the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis. The Anglo-
French rift limited the foreign policy of both countries and played 
into Bismarck's hands. 
Three factors contributed to Bismarck's rise in Europe. First, 
as A.J.P. Taylor notes, by 1865, both Russia and Great Britain had 
virtually eliminated themselves from the European balance. 45 
The former had no interests in the west and clashed with Austria in 
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the Near East. Bismarck could thereby appeal to the Russian axiom: 
"Better a strong Prussia than a strong Austria. 11 4 6 Britain's 
preoccupation with domestic affairs and diplomatic isolation 
weakened her statesmanship and her influence on the continent. 
Secondly, Austria was plagued by ethnic centrifugal forces and 
continued to lose influence within the German Confederation and 
in Europe. The chief interest of Austrian foreign policy was to 
maintain its hold on Venetia and its role in Germany and the Near 
East. Finally, Italy was newly-unified and growing, and had set 
its sights on Venetia to further its unification process. 
Bismarck's manipulation of Napoleon allowed him to establish 
a leading role in European affairs for Prussia. He catered to 
Napoleon's expansionism, exploited his overextension in Italy, and 
capitalized on the growing Anglo-French antagonism. In each of 
these areas, few options were available for British statesmanship 
to reduce the costs in terms of British isolation and the cementing 
of the Bismarckian order in Europe. 
Because he knew that Napoleon was susceptible to territorial 
bribes, Bismarck could act on the Duke of Wellington's adage that, 
"it is not possible to do anything great in the world without 
France. 1147 Had Britain and France been less antagonistic, 
Bismarck's offers of territory might have been less seductive to 
the Emperor. But in light of the cross-channel tensions, he could 
continue his scheme. First, Bismarck catered to Napoleon's 
territorial aspirations in the Rhineland and Luxemburg. Prussian 
policy was couched in terms that would appeal to Napoleon, on the 
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one hand holding out bait to French ambition; on the other, offering 
a compliment to French pride. Bismarck also made the tradeoff clear 
to Napoleon: France could compensate herself with annexations if 
she gave Prussia a free hand in Germany.48 Napoleon knew that 
his territorial extension depended upon cooperating with Prussia. 
He pledged that the true interest of France was not to obtain an 
increase of territory, but rather to help Germany in the most 
favorable way for her interests and those of Europe. 49 By 
delivering French neutrality in the Austro-Prussian conflict, 
Napoleon played into Bismarck's hands. 
The Luxemburg Crisis of the spring of 1867 seemed to realize 
British fears of their southern rival. But even the French threat 
to Luxemburg's sovereignty could not bring British statesmen out 
of their insular shell. The absence of allies forced Lord Stanley, 
the British Foreign Secretary, to pay only lip service to checking 
French ambition in Luxemburg: 50 
The guarantee now given is collective only. That is an 
important distinction. It means this, that in the 
event of a violation of neutrality all the Powers who 
have signed the treaty may be called upon for their 
collective action. No one of these Powers is liable to 
be called upon to act singly or separately. It is a 
case, so to speak, of 'limited liability'. We are 
bound by honour -- you cannot place a legal 
construction upon it -- to see in concert with others 
that these arrangements are maintained. 
There is no indication that Gladstone or others in the Liberal 
Party expressed any more concern than did the Derby Ministry over 
Luxemburg. There is perhaps no better reflection of the degree of 
British detachment from the affairs of the European continent in 
this period than the Luxemburg Question. 
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Bismarck duped Napoleon into a pledge of neutrality in the 
Austro-Prussian War without sacrificing a thing in return. He 
urged the French to assert themselves by annexing Luxemburg: 
"commit yourselves. Present Europe and the King of Prussia with a 
fait accompli. 1I51 Then, without skipping a beat, he cited the 
German responsibility to protect the small state and withdrew his 
support for French annexation, offering instead a promise of 
territory in the Near East. His bluff had hurt French pride, and 
Maustier complained in the autumn of 1867: "You offer us spinach 
without salt, Luxembourg is the salt."52 with Napoleon bitter 
and subject to Europe-wide condemnation, jealousy and suspicion 
became the rule on the frontier of the Rhine. 53 
The insurrection in Crete in the summer of 1866 was the next 
piece in Bismarck's diplomatic puzzle. until Crete, he had taken 
the Near East for granted, but French support for the sanctity 
of the Turkish Empire conflicted with both British and Russian 
policy. Thus, Bismarck could further estrange the French from the 
courts of Europe. The British were sympathetic to the people of 
Crete and Gladstone warned the Turks that mistreatment of them 
would disgrace the Turks in the eyes of Europe. 54 The Czar 
also supported the insurrection as a precedent for Pan-slavism in 
the region. British and Russian condemnation of French policy in 
the Turkish Empire allowed Bismarck to close the door on French 
diplomacy. 
Bismarck's scheme was then furthered by annexing three German 
states following the Austro-Prussian War. The swift Prussian victory 
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forced Napoleon to accept Bismarck's terms which incorporated the 
4.5 million people of Hanover, Hesse and Frankfort, into the German 
Confederation under Prussia, which removed another obstacle to German 
unification. Openly displaying his diplomatic isolation, Napoleon 
had to concede these states to Prussia. 
Bismarck had earlier turned to Italy to manipulate the Italians, 
the French, and the Austrians. The Iron Chancellor later reflected 
on the importance of Italy to his scheme: "Si Italie n'existait pas, 
il faudrait l'inventer.,,55 By dangling venetia as the spoils 
of Italian cooperation in the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck secured 
the secret Prusso-Italian Treaty of April 8, 1866. The promise of 
venetia was enough to gain the Italian army against Austria, leaving 
Austria facing a dreaded two-front war. 
venetia was also a blind spot for French diplomacy. Her 
annexation was seen as another step towards crowning an Italian 
nation, which Napoleon had long advocated as a counterweight to 
Austrian strength in the region. Bismarck knew the risks Napoleon 
was prepared to take to obtain Venetia for Italy and encouraged his 
overextension there. French and Italian armies intent on Venetia 
would thus surround Austrian forces. Bismarck understood the motivation 
of each power, and allowed Austria and France to promote the war which 
led to the destruction of their traditional grandeur in Europe; and 
for both Venetia was the deciding factor. 56 Bismarckian policy 
feasted on French over-extension, Italian aspirations, and Austria's 
vulnerabliity to a two-front war. 
The Venetian Question was the lone opportunity in Phase II for 
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British diplomacy to step in to avert the coming conflict. After 
Austria had rejected Napoleon's call for a Congress over the growing 
Austro-Prussian tensions, she offered venetia to Italy in return 
for Italian neutrality in Germany, and in order to avoid a two-
front war. strong, unambivalent British sponsorship of the offer, 
ideally with French blessings, might have convinced the Italians to 
accept. without asking anything but a promise of Italian neutrality, 
the Austrians would surrender the territory that would bring the 
Italians into war. But the Russell Ministry was preoccupied with 
the issues of parliamentary reform and Fenian violence in Ireland 
and played no role in the negotiations. 
Domestically, Gladstone had built a foundation for the Liberal 
Party. His sponsorship of Irish Church disestablishment unified the 
Liberal Party nationally and within the House of Commons. until the 
outbreak of Fenian violence, however, he saw the problems of church, 
land and education in Ireland as related but out of all bearing on 
the practical politics of the day.57 As his concept of religious 
self-determination evolved by the late 1860s, he began to express 
sympathy for the Irish plight. He was committed to "wipe away the 
stains which the civilized world has for ages seen,,58 in Britain's 
Irish policy. The Fenian violence helped ripen the Irish Church 
issue. 
The violence moved the Commons to suspend the writ of Habeas 
Corpus by an overwhelming majority in February of 1866. 59 Despite 
John stuart Mill's plea that the bill "was a cause for shame and 
humiliation to the country,,,60 most in Britain shared Gladstone's 
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view that the Fenians were "subversive to all that a civilized 
community ought to cherish and maintain. ,,61 Many were sympathetic 
to the causes of the uprising, but fearful of its violence. The 
attempted prison break at Clerkenwell Prison in London on December 11, 
1867, injuring 120 civilians, pushed Gladstone to act for his party, 
stating that for Ireland, "justice delayed is justice denied.,,62 
Gladstone condemned the Anglican Church in Ireland, which 
included only one-eighth of the Irish population in its ranks. 
He saw Ireland as a disgrace and it was the Liberal Party's 
responsibility to bring her, "into the condition of being a great 
part of the glory of this Empire, instead of being, as hitherto, in 
respects neither few or small, our danger and our reproach. 1I63 
To Gladstone, the Irish Church had never demonstrated that it could 
fulfill any of the objects for which a religious Establishment is 
constituted. 64 After carrying a majority of sixty on his 
resolution to disestablish on April 3, 1868, he was attacked by 
Disraeli, who saw disestablishment as depriving Her Majesty's 
subjects of their "precious privileges".65 Just before gaining 
a majority of sixty-five for his resolution on April 30, Gladstone 
replied that the Irish Church kept alive the principles of religious 
inequality and religious ascendancy.66 Despite the bill's 
rejection by the House of Lords on June 20, Gladstone's victory 
secured the resignation of the Disraeli Ministry and passage for 
the bill in the next session. Gladstone had stolen the show for 
his party.67 
Gladstone's national popularity and the unity of the Liberal 
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Party were peaking by the end of 1868. He had won two major battles 
against Disraeli from the opposition front bench by mobilizing his 
support within the Liberal Party. His major legislative successes, 
the Irish Church Bill and the Reform Bill of 1867, could be added to 
his national popularity in the canvassing for the November elections. 
These victories and the relative stability within the Liberal Party 
led to a majority of 112 in the 1868 elections and, accordingly, 
Queen victoria's request for Gladstone to form his first ministry on 
December 1 of that year. 
Gladstone's rise to the leading role in British politics in 
Phase II does not absolve him of some blame for the loss of British 
influence in European affairs. That he and his colleagues could not 
adjust to a changing Europe is clear, but their failure to do so is 
due to their few diplomatic options. British diplomacy had simply 
been painted into a corner. By 1868 the new Bismarckian order 
dictated that Britain could play no active role in Europe. 
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PHASE III: 1869 to 1874 
William Gladstone's first Ministry faced a variety of crises 
in both the foreign and domestic spheres of policy. Swept into 
office at the outset of Phase III by the Liberal Party's overwhelming 
victory in the 1868 Elections, the Prime Minister was armed with a 
huge majority in the Commons, widespread popularity in the press 
and his own arsenal of oratorical skills, parliamentary talents 
and political stamina. Although each crisis in European affairs 
found the Ministry limited in diplomatic options, its foreign policy 
fared well against the challenges of the new Bismarckian European 
order. Domestically, however, the Ministry's flawed legislative 
programme and Gladstone's leadership problems loosened the hold 
of liberalism on British politics by 1874. 
Gladstone faced one of the most tumultous periods in British 
politics in Phase III of this study in terms of party loyalty and 
stability. The Liberal Party's fragmented nature in this period 
can be gauged in two ways. In one measure of party loyalty, the 
voting patterns of seventeen liberal M.P.'s, referred to as the 
Adullamites, were analyzed in relation to Gladstone's votes for 
the fifteen years of this study.1 Of the twenty-five key votes 
studied, not one of the Adullamites matched Gladstone's positions 
on each vote, and as much as thirty percent of the group's votes 
strayed from his for the entire period. 2 The voting patterns 
of the Adullamites show the limited loyalty that Gladstone could 
summon within the Commons even on key issues. A second measure 
of party fragmentation is performance in the four parliamentary 
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elections between 1859 and 1874. In these fifteen years, only 
thirty-one percent of British parliamentary seats were found to 
be stable in terms of party loyalty.3 The high turnover of 
parliamentary seats suggest domestic upheaval, party disorganization 
and the absence of consensus on even key issues. 
It was in this volatile political environment that Gladstone 
accepted the Queen's request to form a government on December 11 
1868 1 with a characteristic sense of duty. His rise to the office 
of Prime Minister capped his life-long application of justice l 
peace l honour, duty, and piety to public service. 4 Much of 
Britain shared his commitment to large-scale reform, with the 
liberal landslide of 1868 providing not only a majority of 112, 
but also a mandate for religious equality, educational opportunity, 
and the release of public services from aristocratic control. 5 
Fresh from the elections, and with a capable Cabinet intent on 
reform measures, Gladstone could realize Lord Palmerston's prophe~y 
that, "whenever he gets my place we shall have strange doings. 1I6 
Gladstone's foreign policy had remained a constant throughout 
his public life. His emphasis on morality in international relations 
was a break from traditional British foreign policy. But I because 
his notion of an ecumenical council of civilised opinion appealed 
neither to the whigs, who preferred the discreet bargains of the 
closet, nor to the Radicals, who saw in it the sinister implications 
of continental involvement, Gladstone lacked widespread support for 
his foreign policy. with Britain hopelessly mired in diplomatic 
isolation by 1870, Clarendon could state that "Europe now cares no 
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more about England than she does about Holland. 118 
Several external events tested the Ministry. Gladstone had 
to respond to the challenges of the Papal Infallibility Doctrine, 
the threat to Belgium and the Franco-Prussian War, all in 1870; 
the terms of the Prussian victory; the renewed Russian challenge 
in the Black Sea; and the Alabama Claims negotiations from 1870 
to 1872. In each, Gladstone secured British interests within the 
context of his doctrine of international law, which can be seen 
as follows: 9 
The greatest triumph of our time, a triumph in a region 
loftier than that of electricity and steam, will be the 
enthronement of the idea of Public Right, as the 
governing idea of European policy; as the common and 
precious inheritance of all lands, but superior to the 
passing opinion of any. 
In the foreign policy of his first Ministry, Gladstone was willing 
to use force on behalf of British interests when the need arose 
and options were present. 
Gladstone's first Ministry is clearly divided into two distinct 
periods. Between 1869 and 1870 the Ministry successfully passed 
legislation like the Irish Church Bill of 1869 and the Irish Land 
Bill and the Education Bill of 1870. The Ministry's early popularity 
is reflected in its competitive stance in the 1869 and 1870 by-
elections. continuing its gains of the 1868 elections, the Liberal 
Party netted three seats in the by-elections of 1869 and lost only 
two seats in those of 1870. 10 Even Gladstone, never one to be 
immodest, found his first year as Prime Minister to have passed with 
"circumstances of favour far beyond what I had dared to anticipate. lIl1 
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Between 1871 and 1874, however, legislative embarrassments 
and intra-Cabinet quarrels overshadowed the previous triumphs of 
the Ministry. By March of 1873, Gladstone understood the depths 
to which his party had fallen, stating that "there is now no cause. 
No great public object on which the Liberal Party are agreed & 
combined. ,,12 The falling popularity of the Liberal Party after 
1870 is reflected in its disastrous performance in by-elections 
between 1871 and 1874. 13 In these four years, the Conservative 
Party averaged a net gain of five seats per year, including a peak 
of eight seats in 1873. 14 The conservative resurgence and the 
whig and Irish desertion of the Liberal Party led to the fall of 
the Ministry. 
Because Gladstone miscalculated the political impact of his 
legislative agenda, his first Ministry fell from grace in five 
short years. Hence, we reach the paradox of Gladstone's first 
Ministry. On one hand, his legislation, avoiding the appearance 
of social upheaval and violence, was conservative in tone and 
alienated radicals and nonconformists by seeming half-hearted. 
On the other hand, by undertaking difficult reform legislation 
and failing to heed fears that he leaned towards the further 
radical steps of English disestablishment, home-rule and secular 
education, he alienated whig-liberals. By attempting an ambitious 
legislative agenda, Gladstone abandoned the formula he used in 
Phase I and Phase II to create the whig-working class entente 
for the Liberal Party: vagueness and lack of party dogma. The 
precariousness of the Liberal coalition caught up with Gladstone. 
Gladstone's first words upon his promotion to the office of 
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Prime Minister, that his "mission is to pacify Ireland,"15 
provided the Ministry's focus for the next five years. He then 
began his legislative assault on the Irish problem. Gladstone's 
approaches to the Irish Upas Tree -- Church, Land, and Education 
-- were novel, but his solutions were thoroughly conservative. 
His object was to stabilize Ireland, not to restructure it for 
the future. 16 For Gladstone, the Irish Question was one 
problem to be solved for Britain to regain its leading role in 
Europe. 17 
The Prime Minister had personal reasons as well as political 
considerations for advocating Irish Church Disestablishment in 1869. 
Personally, he opposed concurrent endowment because demoninational 
funding conflicted with his notion of religious self-determination. 
His Irish Church Bill ended funding for the Church, but was by no 
means an assault on Anglicanism, whose creeds, orders, and mission 
would continue entirely unimpaired. 18 His political motivation 
for Irish Church Disestablishment was its use as a unifying measure 
for the Liberal Party. He campaigned on the issue in the fall of 
1868, and later boasted correctly that the elections had turned 
mainly on the subject of the Irish Church. 19 with a mandate 
for the bill bestowed by the 1868 elections, Gladstone could steer 
the bill through the Commons free from disabling amendments. 
While Gladstone sought only to punish harsh landlords, and 
not to develop a new structure for tenant rights, whig-liberals 
and many in Ireland opposed the principle of the Irish Land Bill. 
The whigs saw the bill as a dangerous precedent for British landlord-
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tenant relations, while radicals felt that Gladstone's bill should 
have gone farther. The bill reverted to the conservative custom of 
Ulster tenant right in granting compensation for disturbances and 
ignored the issues of security of tenure and protection against raised 
rent for tenants. Gladstone outlined the objectives of the bill: 20 
Every line of the measure has been studied with the keenest 
desire that it shall import as little as possible of the 
shock or violent alteration into any single arrangement 
now existing between landlord and tenant in Ireland .... 
Its operations, we believe, will be quiet and gradual. 
Despite the bill's conservative nature, Gladstone failed to alleviate 
whig fears that their livelihoods were under siege. 
In a letter to his whig Foreign Secretary Clarendon, Gladstone 
expressed his commitment to the land bill: "to this all the early 
part of the next Session is dedicated or doomed.,,21 The novelty 
of the approach and the commitment of the Government created an 
impression among whig-liberals that Gladstone rested the fate of 
his Ministry on overhauling the social order. That the bill passed 
by the overwhelming majority of 442 to 11 is perhaps more due to 
the party's popularity in 1870 than to widespread support for the 
bill's provisions. 22 
Meanwhile, the Liberal Party faced a growing Home Rule movement 
in Ireland after the summer of 1870 which would mean disaster for 
its legislation and its following there. 23 The staggering growth 
of the Home Rule Party hurt the Liberal Party far more than the 
Conservative Party. For example, of the sixty-four Irish parliamentary 
seats that began the 1869 session in Liberal Party hands, sixty-
seven percent moved to the Home Rule Party in elections by 1874. 
Conversely, only fifteen percent of Irish seats switched from the 
57 
Conservative Party to the Home Rulers in the same period. 24 
The growth of the Home Rule Party dealt a huge blow to the Liberal 
Party's following in Ireland. 
The Education Bill of 1870 further compromised the Ministry's 
support within the Liberal Party. The bill sought to offer adequate 
elementary education throughout Britain, and Gladstone emphasized 
that a school had been placed within the reach of every child. 25 
Yet, because of Gladstone's personal commitment to denominationalism 
and local funding, the bill became, in Forster's view, "the most 
conservative proposal which might satisfy liberal opinion.,,26 
Gladstone's version failed to provide the progressive solutions of 
a country-wide school board, a national education system, and 
compulsory attendance. Again, Gladstone miscalculated the impact 
of his legislation. By injecting his religious fervor into the bill, 
Gladstone compromised both whig and nonconformist support. Both 
groups were more advanced in their view of the role of religion in 
education. The whigs attacked with the Cowper-Temple Amendment, 
which banned the use of formularies in public schools and radicals 
were driven towards the alternative of secular education. 
The first foreign challenge of the period came in the events 
leading up to the Franco-Prussian War, which disrupted both the 
Ministry's support and the peace of Europe. Gladstone had little 
respect for either side in the conflict, finding Napoleon and 
Bismarck "nearly on a par,,,27 but he and his Cabinet saw France 
as a "demon of ambition and aggression.,,28 His suspicions seemed 
confirmed by Bismarck's publication of the 1867 Benedetti Treaty in 
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the Times on July 25, 1870, which outlined Napoleon's eastward 
designs. 29 Anglo-French enmity continued to playa key role in 
Bismarck's diplomatic scheme. 
Gladstone had few diplomatic options. Alienated from France, 
distrusting Bismarck, removed from the Pruss ian-minded Czar, and 
with Austria again beset by inter-cultural conflict, he saw no 
prospect for joint intervention. At home, the consensus for 
neutrality meant that the Prime Minister must maintain "intact 
the character and fame of England while this unhappy war shall 
continue. ,,30 Because of his antipathy to both sides and his 
lack of diplomatic options, Gladstone made Britain's only role in 
the conflict that of a spectator. 
An opportunity for active British foreign policy to prevent 
or at least delay the conflict presented itself early in the summer 
of 1870. Napoleon had been secretly negotiating with Austria and 
Italy to form an alliance against Prussia. In fact, Sir Spencer 
Walpole maintains that if the battles of Wissembourg and Reichshofen 
had been postponed for eight days, the alliance would have been 
secured. 31 British support for the alliance might have lessened 
anti-Prussian feeling in France and avoided war. But, British 
distrust of Napoleon, the uncertainty that Italy and Austria would 
subject their armies to a war bearing no fruit for their interests, 
the secrecy of the negotiations, and the rapid course of events doomed 
the alliance and led to war. 
The next external challenge to the Ministry came in 1870 not 
from Prussia or France, but from the vatican. The Doctrine of 
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Papal Infallibility threatened the Government both at home and 
abroad. Domestically, it drew Gladstone's ire because it "cast 
in doubt the civic allegiance of all Roman Catholic populations,"32 
thereby severing a link that Gladstone had spent years building. 
He also feared that the Papal decree would lead to an outbreak of 
Fenian violence in Ireland. 33 Most importantly, the decree 
conflicted with his religious outlook, which saw the political 
influence of the Church as a threat to individual liberty. 
Having always harbored resentment to the Pope's political rule 
in Rome, Gladstone condemned the decree. He observed that only 
threats would be noted by a Pope whose "whole policy is based 
on the rejection of reason.,,34 Because the carrot would no 
longer work with the vatican, the Prime Minister hoped to use 
Napoleon's forces as the stick. with the Emperor overextended in 
Italy, Gladstone had an opportunity to threaten Pius IX with 
Italian invasion by urging the withdrawal of French troops from Rome. 
To Gladstone, withdrawal of the troops was the only policy "which 
the Pope & his myrmidons care about.,,35 But, the Anglo-French 
antagonism limited Gladstone's options in responding to the Papal 
Decree. 
Although his diplomacy was respectable, Gladstone's policy 
towards the Papacy alienated whigs both within and outside the 
Cabinet. His ministers, led by Clarendon, overruled Gladstone's 
hopes of expressing Britain's strong opposition to the decree. 
Then, Argyll and other whigs, in light of the threat posed by 
the Paris Commune, sought coercive legislation to put down the Fenian 
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violence and challenged Gladstone's release of the remaining Fenian 
prisoners. Gladstone's response to the Papal decree failed both 
at home and abroad. 36 
The threat to Belgian sovereignty was the next external threat 
to the Ministry. Gladstone held to the terms of the Treaty of 1839, 
stating that a French or German threat to Belgian neutrality would 
bring Britain to the "very edge of war. ,,37 In one of his greatest 
foreign policy initiatives, Gladstone concluded a treaty guaranteeing 
Belgian safety. The treaty stipulated that if one side violated 
Belgian neutrality, then Britain would join the other for her defense, 
but without entering the large-scale conflict. 38 
Gladstone's swift and resolute action on behalf of Belgium was 
popular in Britain. He had authored a major treaty while risking 
little chance of engaging Britain in armed conflict. If the treaty 
failed to guarantee Belgian neutrality, Gladstone showed signs of 
his willingness to intervene militarily. On July 16, 1870, he 
asked Cardwell to submit a report on the possibility of sending 
20,000 men to Antwerp to further protect Belgium. 39 Gladstone 
thereby proved his willingness to involve his country in continental 
affairs when the sanctity of a treaty was compromised or a fundamental 
British interest was at stake. 
The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War posed the greatest 
threat to the Ministry's foreign policy. But Gladstone and the 
Cabinet acted in a restrained manner due to British diplomatic 
isolation and the demands of an ambitious legislative agenda. That 
the Gladstone Ministry managed to protect Britain's interests and 
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avoid entangling her in the conflict is a testament to its sound 
diplomacy. Bismarck's foreign policy was never better than in the 
days leading up to the Franco-Prussian War. In just a few weeks, 
the Iron Chancellor reduced France from the first place among 
European nations to fifth or even sixth place. 40 By manipulating 
French fears one moment and French pride the next, Bismarck forced 
the ill-prepared Napoleon into the tragic undertaking. It was a 
conflict that even Marshall Niel, the French Minister of War, claimed 
no part in, declaring that he would rather be cut in pieces than 
advise the Emperor to enter a European war without allies. 41 
Napoleon's mishandling of the spanish Throne Crisis in the 
spring of 1870 allowed Bismarck to set his trap. The fatal mistake 
on the French part was the Duc de Gramont's ex post facto demand for 
a Prussian guarantee that no Hohenzollern would ever sit on the 
Spanish Throne. The mistake altered European opinion, which until 
then had rested with France, but, as a result of the unnecessary 
demand, was transferred to Prussia. 42 The Spanish Question 
gave Bismarck the edge he needed against the French. 
Preoccupied with the Irish Land and Education Bills, the 
Ministry failed to note the sharpened Franco-Prussian tensions. 
Gladstone outlined the Government's insulation from the crisis: 43 
.... the Government have exercised, and will exercise, 
all the legitimate and friendly influence they may be 
supposed to possess ..•. for the purpose of preventing an 
event so calamitous and so deplorable as that a great 
European conflagration and bloodshed should arise. 
Had his Cabinet been less strained domestically, Gladstone might 
have made a stronger offer to use the British good offices to 
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mediate. But, because of the rapid course of events and the deep-
seated hostility on both sides, there is no indication that such 
an overture would have been accepted in either Berlin or Paris. 
Bismarck struck while French forces were unprepared. His 
alteration of the Ems Telegram moved the overconfident Napoleon 
to declare war. The French, disorganized militarily, were soon 
awestruck by the Prussian war machine, which had longed for a 
chance to measure itself against France. 44 Once mobilized, 
the strength of the Prussian military forces overmatched the French. 
Gladstone conveyed his miscalculation of the consequences of German 
unification, when he stated that it was "not a matter on which 
other countries are entitled to take any hostile cognisance.,,45 
His diplomacy was hamstrung by his limited options, but it risked 
no British interests or British forces on his uncertain understanding 
of the new Bismarckian order. 
While a consensus existed in Britain regarding neutrality in 
the Franco-Prussian War, the debate over the British role in the 
postwar negotiations was more divisive. The peace talks represent 
the crowning of Bismarck's Europe and the final defeat of Gladstone's 
notion of international cooperation. By the autumn of 1870, force 
had replaced negotiation in European diplomacy and all of Europe 
breathed a harsher air. 46 At home, disagreement within the 
Cabinet over Britain's role in the peace talks limited Gladstone 
to only watch as Germany dictated severe peace terms. 
Because he knew that they would have wide implications for 
Europe, Gladstone hoped for Britain to play an active role in the 
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talks. He was unopposed to flexibility of boundaries, but required 
legitimation of their change. 47 He had three concerns about 
Prussia's demands. First, he argued that because the legitimate 
defense of Germany did not necessitate its domination of Alsace-
Lorraine, the region should be neutralized. Secondly, in a letter 
to John Bright he condemned the German argument that victory entitled 
her to territory:48 
My opinion certainly is that the transfer of territory 
and inhabitants by mere force calls for the reprobation 
of Europe, & that Europe is entitled to utter it, & can 
utter it with good effect. 
Finally, Gladstone objected to German designs on Alsace-Lorraine 
without considering the rights of its people. He held that the 
inhabitants of the region should not be handed over to Germany 
against their will. 49 
Two factors limited Gladstone's policy. First, although it 
agreed with the general terms of Gladstone's argument, the Cabinet 
was hesitant to involve Britain in the negotiations. A more 
confident Prime Minister might have brought the Cabinet to his side, 
but Gladstone was preoccupied with domestic affairs, understood the 
limited diplomatic options available, was never an expert on foreign 
matters, and was a shaky leader of his Ministry. He therefore failed 
to win his Cabinet's favor for an activist policy. Led by the whigs 
Granville and Hatherley, the Cabinet took the view that it would 
intervene only if British interests were at stake. Granville wrote 
of his battle with Gladstone over the peace talks: 50 
Quite exhausted .... after the longest fight I ever had 
against Gladstone. The losses were great; the killed 
and wounded innumerable; but I remained in possession 
of the field and the Cabinet. He wanted to declare our 
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views on the conditions of peace; I was against doing 
so. 
Gladstone experienced the greatest foreign policy defeat of his 
first Ministry at the hands of his own Cabinet. Secondly, British 
condemnation of the peace terms was muzzled by her isolation from 
European affairs. Gladstone's high-principled assault was ignored 
in Berlin without the combined force of the European powers. His 
words had no power to moderate the policy of blood and iron. 51 
During the heat of the Alsace-Lorraine Question, another 
challenge to European peace and British diplomacy appeared in the 
form of the Gortchakoff Circular. Gladstone's support for a 
conference to settle the dispute over the Russian renouncement of 
the 1856 Treaty of Paris was unpopular domestically and highlighted 
Britain's diplomatic isolation. At home, the Ministry had to weather 
Disraeli's attacks on the risks of the London Conference. Disraeli 
assailed the Ministry's support for the London Conference as 
contradictory and inconsistent. 52 
In diplomatic terms, however, the Cabinet's policy toward the 
Russian Black Sea demands of 1870 should be applauded on three levels. 
First, Granville's treaty revision in 1870 endangered no British 
interests because the agreement afforded Turkey as much leeway as 
it did Russia. 53 Secondly, because of the relative disinterest 
among the other powers of Europe for the Russian action, the Ministry 
had little chance of maintaining the Treaty of Paris as it stood. 54 
For example, the French sent a representative only for the official 
signing of the new treaty. Finally, and most importantly, Gladstone 
turned the tables on the initial Russian challenge by bringing the 
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dispute under the collective consideration of the European powers,55 
thereby setting a precedent for the future. The precedent was in 
Granville's conclusion that an essential principle of the law of 
nations was "that no power can liberate itself from the engagements 
of a treaty.,,56 
By 1871, the Gladstone Ministry had lost the support of the 
whigs. The Irish Land and Education Bills of 1870, the growth of 
Fenian violence, the Russian Black Sea challenge, and intra-Cabinet 
tensions over the Papal decree and the fate of Alsace-Lorraine 
combined to weaken the Ministry. Whigs from both within and 
outside the Cabinet deserted Gladstone over these issues. The whig 
George Grey challenged the Prime Minister to make a firm stand against 
the extreme sections of the party or "some of our institutions will 
be in great danger. 1I57 Another whig, Earl Fortescue, reacted 
against the pull of nonconformity and the creation of the Home-Rule 
Association in Ireland in the spring of 1870 by vowing that 
"constitutional whigs are not going to be dragged into the abyss 
of wild democracy merely to keep out the Tories." 58 By the time 
of Disraeli's Crystal Palace Speech in June of 1872, which sought 
to win disaffected whigs to the conservative side, it was clear that 
Britain was experiencing a conservative resurgence. The conservative 
backlash was accelerated by the Ministry's further legislation, 
its financial bumbling, the Alabama negotiations and the failure 
of the Irish University Bill in 1873. 
The Army Regulations Bill of 1871 and the Civil Service Act 
of 1870 reflect the reasons for the fall of Gladstone's first 
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Ministry. The Prime Minister hoped to replace the corruption of 
Army promotion purchases and civil Service patronage with merit-
based systems. But both bills were taken by the Court and the 
landed classes as an assault on their way of life and helped to 
accelerate their steady drift away from the Liberal Party. 
Gladstone saw his attackers as representing the failure of the 
landed class to justify its existence in the modern world. 59 
The bills drove the whig Knatchbull-Hugessen to express his growing 
distrust of Gladstone's "leaning to the extreme party.,,60 
The issues of local taxation and the role of trade unions 
further estranged both the whigs and the radicals from the Liberal 
Party. The debate over local taxation was in full swing during 
the 1872 session,61 with the Lopes measure defeating the 
Ministry by a hundred votes. 62 The Trade Union and Criminal 
Law Amendment Acts of 1871 caused further alarm among whigs because 
they seemed to lead to domestic upheaval. In practice, however, 
radicals were put off by the conservative interpretations of the 
laws, which led to violence and condemnation of the Government. 
Gladstone was largely unsympathetic to the union causes, but saw 
the political gains in granting moderate concessions. Again, 
Gladstone's policy angered all and pleased none. To whigs and 
industrialists, the Ministry appeared to be taking the side of 
strikes and social disturbance, while, to the radicals, it appeared 
to be sanctioning repression. 
The Alabama Claims Question occupied three years and severely 
tested the Prime Minister's energy and political tact. Gladstone's 
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patience resulted in perhaps his greatest foreign policy achievement: 
establishing the use of arbitration as a means of settling 
international disputes. At home, however, the length of the 
negotiations and costs of the settlement created the impression that 
the Ministry was weak. 
Gladstone publicly denounced American intentions in the Alabama 
dispute. He maintained the position from the outset that he would 
make no admission "that reparation is due from us to America in the 
matter of the Alabama.,,63 He made light of the American claims, 
arguing that Britain could make similar remonstrances against the 
united states for its role in causing the Lancashire Famine64 
and in North American Fenianism. 65 He would under no circumstances 
allow the Cabinet to stray from its, "sacred and paramount duty,,66 
to its country in the negotiations. He would not budge from his 
view that the matter should go before arbitration and that American 
indirect claims should be dropped. His patience allowed both to be 
achieved in the final settlement in June of 1872. 
The significance of the Alabama Question lies in Gladstone's 
commitment to arbitration as an effective tribunal for international 
disputes. The Prime Minister saw the impact of the Alabama Question 
in the scope of its bearing on the subject of arbitration and "upon 
the future interests of the world. ,,67 He risked British prestige 
on an experiment in the application of justice and morality to 
international disputes and emerged with a victory for his diplomacy. 
Domestically, Disraeli's harsh attacks marred Gladstone's 
victory. Following the arbitrator's decision that Britain owed 
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$15.5 million to the united states,68 the conservative leader could 
emphasize the Government's feebleness in the negotiations: 69 
It does appear to me that if we get into a Serbonian 
bog of diplomacy upon this matter the consequences may 
be enormous and fatal. It is one of those questions 
which ought not be allowed to drag its own slow length 
along. 
The time eaten by the negotiations and the cost of the settlement 
blemished the diplomatic precedent set by Gladstone's policy. 
A great leader possesses the political agility to adjust 
both his agenda and personal approach to the political exigencies 
of the day. Because Gladstone would not adjust his legislative 
agenda, he lost the support of the whigs on one hand by appearing 
to drift towards the radical sector, and the radicals on the other 
by offering seemingly half-hearted solutions to societal problems. 
Instead of anticipating a conservative resurgence by 1870 as a 
reaction to the reforms of 1867, Gladstone clung to his agenda and 
never publicly emphasized the concessions that his legislative 
offered each group in the Liberal Party. 
Gladstone's shaky leadership of the Ministry also contributed 
to divisions within the party and accelerated the fall of the 
Government. His overbearing and moralizing manner was more suited 
to a cabinet position than for the office of Prime Minister. 70 
He lacked interest in gossip and in the small change of politics 
and "intimidated colleagues and subordinates from keeping him in 
touch with those small details which signal danger to the acute 
political eye.,,71 Gladstone was an enigmatic figure to his 
Cabinet and was an inconsistent and under-confident leader. 
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His uncertain leadership in the questions of the budgets and 
the Estimates crippled the Ministry. First, finding Lowe at the 
Exchequer an ineffective ally against the spending departments, 
he lost his party's monopoly on the issue of government thrift.72 
Lowe's 1871 Budget had to be withdrawn by Gladstone and became a 
major embarrassment to the Ministry. Similarly, the Cabinet lost 
popularity by battling over the Estimates. The French loss to 
Prussia in 1870 removed the only threat to British coastal defenses 
and, to Gladstone, all legitimate demands for increased defense 
spending. Nonetheless, projections for the Army Estimates rose by 
over eighteen percent between the budgets of 1870-71 and 1872-73. 73 
That Gladstone could not maintain his trademark "retrenchment" is 
a testament to his weak leadership of the Cabinet. 
Facing a conservative resurgence and with a divisive legislative 
agenda, the defeat of the Irish University Bill in 1873 sealed the 
fate of the Government. Although solving the University Question 
in Ireland was a progressive aim, the bill drafted by Gladstone and 
Thring, the legislative counsel, was conservative. From the start, 
Gladstone had private reservations about the bill because of the 
fragmentation of the Liberal Party. He saw "no more doubtful point 
in the composition & tendencies of the Liberal Party than its 
disposition to extremes in the matter of unsectarianism.,,74 
Nonetheless, Gladstone saw the issue as a unifier for his party and 
announced that the bill was vital to the existence of the Government. 75 
The provisions of the University Bill were "characteristically 
neat and Burkean",76 but still failed to gain support within the 
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Liberal Party. It was defeated for three reasons: the desertion 
of Irish M.P.'s, largely due to the rise of the Home Rule Party, 
the conservative resurgence -- Glyn (Chief Whip) had reported on 
July 6, 1872, that the Liberal majority had dwindled from 112 to 86 
77 and the whig assumption that the bill set a dangerous precedent 
for British higher education. 
The whigs fled from the University Bill for two reasons. 
First, the Gladstone Ministry seemed to be threatening a fundamental 
axiom of British society: the bond between education and the Church 
of England. Secondly, with the Government obviously in peril due 
to its diminishing majority, the conservative resurgence was 
apparent to the whigs. The handwriting was on the wall following 
the Ministry's defeat on the Irish University Bill in the spring of 
1873. Disraeli understood the depths to which the Liberal Party 
had fallen and brilliantly rejected office so that it could expose 
its own vulnerabilities. By the autumn of 1873, Gladstone had 
little hope for his party and found himself the leader of a 
demoralized government with little hope of remaining in power. 
Gladstone's first Ministry poses several paradoxes. While 
Phase III of this period marks the beginning of a new era of 
domestic reform, it also saw the precariousness of the Liberal 
Party and the growth of pluralism defeat a capable and reform-
minded Ministry. Stronger and more flexible leadership and a less 
rigid legislative agenda from a Prime Minister already enjoying 
tremendous popularity, an overwhelming majority in the Commons, and 
an electoral mandate for reform might have secured the hold of 
71 
liberalism on Great Britain. Yet, while Gladstone and his Ministry 
failed the test of the 1874 Elections, the reforms of his first 
Ministry and the benefits of the liberal experiment have passed the 
test of time. 
Similarly, although Gladstone was preoccupied with domestic 
struggles and, because of Britain's isolation, had few options in 
the international arena, the foreign policy record of his first 
Ministry is respectable. Gladstone's foreign policy in Phase III 
regained little of Britain's past glory and position in Europe, 
but it sacrificed nothing in the face of new external challenges. 
The legacy of Gladstone's foreign policy is his reliance on justice, 
treaty obligations and international cooperation as the guiding 
principles in diplomacy. Indeed, Gladstone's solutions to the Black 
Sea Question and the Alabama dispute set precedents for future 
interaction between nations, just as the Prime Minister's principles 
and commitment to his beloved nation set precedents for future 
statesmen. 
72 
ENDNOTES FOR PHASE III 
IThese liberal M.P.'s were said by John Bright to have 
been in the "cave of Adullam", because they voted against some 
form of the 1866 Reform Bill. The Adullamites were chosen as a 
measure of the cohesiveness of the Liberal Party because they were 
active members of the Commons and, with 5 whigs, 5 country 
landowners, 3 liberals, and 4 nonconformists, they represent an 
excellent cross-section of the Liberal Party. 
2NO trend was found that links the timing of the loss in 
Liberal Party popularity with an increase in voting divergence among 
the Adullamites. They voted in their self-interest and had little 
loyalty to their party on most issues. Also, the 30% of votes that 
differed from Gladstone's is actually higher when one considers the 
high number of abstentions. 
3To qualify as a stable parliamentary seat, a seat had to 
both be unchanged in each of the four elections between 1859 and 
1874 and remain under the auspices of one party throughout. 
4H. C. G. Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968-1986), 9 vols., Vol. 8, p. 264. 
5 Ibid., 8: 348. 
6George Macauley Trevelyan, British History in the 
Nineteenth Century, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1922), p. 343. 
7Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 48, Intro. 
8Raymond Sontag, Germany and England: Backqround in 
Conflict (1848-1894). (New York: D. Appleton Cantury Company, 
Inc., 1938). 
9Will iam E. Gladstone, "Germany, France, and England", 
Edinburgh Review, October, 1870, p. 554. 
10By-election calculations in J. Vincent and M. Stenton, 
eds., McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book, (Sussex: Harvester 
Press, 1971), pp. 1-344. 
11 . Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diarles, 7: 208. 
12Ibid., 7: 88, Intro. 
13Before 1870, neither party netted more than five seats 
in anyone year's by-elections and neither party gained anything 
close to momentum. After 1870, however, the Conservative Party 
dominated by-elections: it gained 2 seats in 1870, 5 seats in 1871, 
9 seats in 1872, and 7 seats in 1873. 
14Vincent and Stenton, eds., McCalmont's Parliamentary 
Poll Book, pp. 1-344. 
73 
15Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century, 
p. 351. 
16Ibid., p. 57. 
17At st. Helens on August 5, 1868, Gladstone spoke of his 
embarrassment over the Irish Question; stating that, "the conduct of 
England towards Ireland is disapproved by the civilized world at large. 1I 
The Times, (London), August 6, 1868. 
18Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates, (London: Cornelius 
Buck), 3rd S., Vol. 196, c. 1060. 
19Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 55, Intro. 
20Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 199, c. 333. 
21Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 119. 
22Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 199, c. 1828. 
23Barry McGill, Parliamentary Parties (1868-1885), 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: unpublished, September, 1952), p. 142. 
24Calculations in Vincent and Stenton, eds., McCalmont's 
Parliamentary Poll Book, pp. 1-344. 
25Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth century, 
p. 354. 
26J . p • Parry, Democracy and Religion, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 304. 
27Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 344. 
28 b'd I 1 0, 7: 28. 
29The Times, (London), July 25, 1870. 
30 Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 203, c. 1313. 
31sir Spencer Walpole, The History of Twenty Five Years, 
(London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904-08), 2 vOls, Vol. 2, p. 353. 
32Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 41, Intro. 
330n April 16, 1870, Gladstone wrote to Archbishop Manning 
of his fears of: "the ulterior consequences likely to follow from 
the interference of the Pope and Council in the affairs of the civil 
sphere." Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 277. 
34Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 254. 
35Ibid. 
74 
36Ironically, despite Gladstone's longtime antipathy to 
the Papacy and his recent outcry against the Papal decree, many whigs 
continued to see Gladstone as pro-Catholic because of his release of 
the convicted Fenians. 
37Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 19. 
38walpole, The History of Twenty Five Years, 2: 505. 
39Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 327. 
40Walpole, The History of Twenty Five Years, 2: 502. 
41Ibid., 2: 459. 
42 Ibid., 2: 490. 
43Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 203, c. 33. 
44Walpole, The History of Twenty Five Years, 2: 458. 
45Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 44, Intro. 
46Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century, 
p. 366. 
47Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 44, Intro. 
48 Ibid., 7: 374. 
49 Ibid., 7: 357. 
50Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, The Life of Granville, (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1922), 2 vols., Vol. 2, p. 62. 
51walpole, The History of Twenty Five Years, 7: 506. 
52Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 204, c. 839. 
53The Treaty of London ended in a compromise agreement, 
with Turkey regaining control of the Black Sea straits and Russia 
gaining freedom from limits on the number of her ships that were 
allowed in the Black Sea. 
54Fitzmaurice, The Life of Granville, 2: 75. 
55Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 126. 
56Fitzmaurice, The life of Granville, 2: 75. 
57parry, Democracy and Religion, p. 323. 
58Ibid., p. 324. 
75 
59 Ibid., 7: 71-
60 Ibid., p. 352. 
61The notion of local taxation superceding central taxation 
stirred up support among the middle class, but conflicted with 
Gladstone's sense of efficiency and government thrift. To Gladstone, 
it would place too much power in the hands of local authority and 
dangerously reduce government coffers. 
62 Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 210, c. 1331. 
63 Ibid., 3rd S., Vol. 210, c. 348. 
64Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 43. 
65Ibid., 7: 306. 
66 Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 209, c. 73. 
67 Ibid., 3rd S., Vol. 211, c. 662. 
68parry, Democracy and Religion, p. 352. 
69Hansard, 3rd S., Vol. 209, c. 73. 
70Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, 7: 70, Intro. 
71Ibid. , 7: 73, Intro. 
72 Ibid. , 7: 81, Intro. 
73 Ibid. , 8: 76. 
74 Ibid. , 8: 14. 
75 Ibid. , 7: 61, Intro. 
76Ibid . 
77Ibid., 8: 174. 
76 
CONCLUSION 
This study has sought to determine whether Gladstone's 
statesmanship is to blame for Britain's loss of influence in 
European affairs. The interpretation suggested here through the 
discussion of the events between 1859 and 1874, is that Britain 
was already diplomatically isolated by the end of Phase I and 
had few diplomatic options in Phase II and Phase III. Thus, with 
his hands tied diplomatically by the new Bismarckian order, Gladstone 
had no chance of regaining Britain's lost influence when he assumed 
the office of Prime Minister from 1869 to 1874. 
In Phase I, 1859 to 1874, Gladstone's financial policy met the 
challenges of pluralism and unified the Liberal Party under his 
leadership. But, the tone was set for Britain's isolation from 
the continent for the next fifteen years. Bismarck's new European 
order was assured by the sharpening of the Anglo-French tensions 
after Napoleon's annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1860. The Polish 
Question of 1862 was proof of the cross-channel enmity, allowing 
Bismarck's aggression in Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 to doom Britain's 
foreign policy to a secondary role in European affairs. 
In Phase II, 1865 to 1868, Britain was severely tested by 
the movement for parliamentary reform. Again, Gladstone showed 
that his domestic policy was up to the challenge by authoring the 
1867 Reform Bill which unified the Liberal Party. The preoccupations 
of reform gave both the Russell and Derby Ministries no time for 
diplomatic challenges that mattered little to the European order 
because events had already painted Britain into a diplomatic corner 
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by Palmerston's death in 1865. Because of Britain's isolation, her 
statesmen had little room to maneuver and few diplomatic options. 
Gladstone and his colleagues could only watch as Bismarck further 
consolidated his rule of Europe by trouncing Austria in the summer 
of 1866. By the 1868 Elections, which bestowed a tremendous majority 
of 112 on the Liberal Party, Britain was without diplomatic options. 
Phase III, 1869 to 1874, provided Gladstone and liberalism 
with their first test at the helm of British policy. Gladstone 
and his first Ministry overlooked the precarious coalition that 
was the British Liberal Party and attempted a divisive legislative 
agenda. By antagonizing each segment of the liberal coalition 
by a part of the agenda, and thereby dividing the whig-working class 
entente, Gladstone allowed domestic embarrassments to overshadow 
his relatively successful foreign policy. In so doing, he lost 
widespread support for his party despite his diplomatic prowess in 
protecting Belgian sovereignty, organizing the Black Sea Conference, 
and establishing the precedent for arbitration in the Alabama Claims 
Question. Although his domestic policy faltered during his first 
Ministry, his diplomacy was respectable in light of his options. 
Gladston~S legacy for this period is his patronage of the 
liberal movement in Britain and his infusion of morality into the 
art of politics. For the benefit of the Liberal Party, Gladstone 
merged his Burkean liberalism with the movement and transformed 
British domestic policy from the disinterest of Palmerston's era 
to his reform-minded legislation that was ahead of its time. His 
legislative achievements are numerous, including the 1860 Budget, 
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the Cobden Treaty, the Paper Duties Repeal, the 1867 Reform Bill, 
the Irish Church Bill, the Irish Land Bill, the Education Bill, 
and the Army Reform Bill. Up to 1870, his legislative record was 
outstanding and his efforts unified the Liberal Party by offering 
something to each component group in the coalition. without Gladstone's 
patronage, the liberal movement in Britain would have faltered. 
No British statesman, before or since, had such high standards 
for himself or his nation. Gladstone's eclectic religious outlook 
and uncompromising moral principles were injected into his foreign 
policy and his legislation. But, his ethical approach to foreign 
policy was reduced by the new Bismarckian order which, by isolating 
Britain, gave her few options in responding to continental events. 
Gladstone's leadership was far from perfect, but one cannot 
point to his statesmanship as the cause of the loss of British 
influence in continental affairs in the new Bismarckian order. He 
inherited a Britain beset by two confounding problems and could 
solve only the most important challenge, the domestic. On one hand, 
the rise of liberalism threatened to overturn domestic order and 
confronted his moderate ideology. He responded by adjusting his 
ideology and hedging his progressive evolution to sponsor the 
Liberal Party through financial policy and legislative initiatives 
while avoiding domestic upheaval. On the other hand, the Bismarckian 
order established by the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864 left 
Britain without an ally and without a role in Europe. 
By the time Gladstone assumed the responsibility of foreign 
policy in 1869, British options were further reduced and Bismarck 
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was well on his way to European hegemony. In light of British 
diplomatic options, the foreign policy of Gladstone's first Ministry 
was respectable and did not further isolate Britain. The damage to 
British influence had been done under Palmerston, and Gladstone 
simply could not make up the difference. As a result, in the age 
of nationalism, Britain would maintain its isolation for the next 
fifteen years at the hands of the Iron Chancellor and the Liberal 
Party was demoted to minority status. 
Between 1859 and 1874, Gladstone faced one of the most tumultous 
periods in British History. Despite unprecedented challenges in 
both foreign and domestic affairs, Gladstone's statesmanship set 
a new level of achievement for British leaders and established 
liberalism as a force in European affairs. His statesmanship in 
this period proves that morality can be successfully pursued in the 
art of politics. 
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